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Abstract
The literature on exchanges of information has ignored rms entry deci-
sions. Yet, the Federal Trade Commission recently expressed concerns that
exchanges of information in business-to-business electronic platforms would
adversely impact entry and, thus, consumers. When entry decisions are endo-
genized in a competitive Cournot model with cost uncertainty, we nd results
that contrast sharply with current thinking on the welfare consequences of
information sharing.
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In 1994, the European Commission rejected an agreement to exchange information pro-
posed by a tractor trade association in the U.K. on the ground that it raised barriers to
entry and, thus, negatively impacted consumer welfare.1 The Federal Trade Commission
recently expressed the same concerns regarding exchanges of information in business-to-
business (hereafter B2B) electronic marketplaces.2 In their literature review for the
European Commission, Kuhn and Vives (1995) report that, under Cournot competition
and cost uncertainty, a complete sharing of cost information raises rms prots, but is
harmful to consumers in oligopoly structures with fewer than 10 rms.3 This literature,
however, does not fully address the policy makers concerns since it ignores rms entry
decisions.
When entry decisions are endogenized, we nd results that contrast sharply with the
existing literature. For instance, rms may not always have an incentive to exchange
cost information. This result holds when an agreement to pool information encourages
additional entry on the market which, in turn, lowers expected prots per rm. We also
identify situations where rms decide not to share information, but nevertheless, social
welfare would be improved by a cost sharing agreement. In such cases, policy-makers
should therefore entice rms to exchange information. We then highlight that it may
1Decision from the European Commission dated February 17, 1992 and Court of First Instance
Ruling dated October 27, 1994. Kuhn and Vives (1995) also outline the case.
2The October 2000 report entilted ￿Entering the 21st Century: Competition Policy in the World of
B2B Electronic Marketplaces￿ is available on the Commission￿s web site.
3Vives (1999) provides a comprehensive summary of the literature. See, as well, Fried (1984), Gal-Or
(1985, 1986), Malueg and Tsutsui (1998), Raith (1996), Sakai and Yamato (1989), Shapiro (1986), and
Vives (1984, 1990).
2be possible to encourage this exchange without any monetary transfers. Finally, we
nd that, even if the number of entrants is the same whether or not rms exchange
information, then consumers may benet in market structures with as few as two rms.
These results are signicant, since policy makers typically consider consumer welfare to
be the deciding factor in antitrust cases.
The paper is structured as follows. We describe the standard oligopoly model in
Section 2 and generalize it slightly in Section 3. We then introduce the model with
entry in Section 4 and analyze its implications. Section 5 concludes.
2. The Standard Oligopoly Model
Exchanges of cost information have usually been analyzed under a standard oligopoly
model (hereafter SOM) originally proposed by Fried (1984), Shapiro (1986) and then
extended by Sakai and Yamato (1989) and Raith (1996). We now summarize the main
f e a t u r e so ft h i sm o d e l .
There are N rms (i =1 ;:::;N) competing on a single market, each producing a
di¤erentiated product. Let xi be the output of the ith rm, and pi its unit price. On
the demand side, there is a representative consumer with the following quadratic utility
function:




















where x0 is the numeraire good, a>0 and ¡1=(n ¡ 1) · b · 1. The representative
3consumer budget constraint is x0 +
PN
i=1 pixi = m; where m is the consumers income.
The corresponding optimization problem leads to the following system of inverse demand
functions:
pi = a ¡ xi ¡ b
N X
j6=i
xj 8i =1 ;:::;N : (2.2)
These demand functions are assumed to be common knowledge.
Marginal costs of production, ci (i =1 ;:::;N), are typically assumed to be jointly
normally distributed with E(ci)=¹>0;Va r (ci)=¾2, Cov(ci;c j)=½¾2 8 i 6= j
and ¡1=(n ¡ 1) · ½ · 1:4 Marginal costs are assumed to be private information. In
other words, each rm knows its own marginal cost but does not observe its rivals.5
The game consists of three stages:
² Stage 1: Firms jointly decide whether or not to enter a binding agreement to
exchange cost information. Under this agreement, rms truthfully reveal to each
other their cost vector ci at the beginning of stage 2. It is assumed that rms can
transfer and verify each others reports at no cost and renegotiations after stage 1
are not allowed.6
² Stage 2: If all rms agreed to share information in stage 1, then each rm observes
4See, for instance, Fried (1984), Gal-Or (1986), Raith (1996), Shapiro (1986), Sakai and Yamato
(1989), and Vives (1999). Note that the normality assumption is chosen in the literature because it
yields a¢ne conditional expectations (e.g. E (cjjci)=‰(ci ¡ „)+„ 8j 6= i) and analytical tractability.
5In the context of the SOM, it is technically equivalent to have the constant marginal cost of pro-
duction or a ￿rm-speci￿c demand intercept (ﬁi) be private values to the ￿rm. Note that some models
assume that ￿rms only observe a noisy signal e ci = ci + "i where "i is an error term (see Raith (1996)).
6Okuno-Fujiwara et al. (1990) and Ziv (1993) show that ￿rms may want to renegotiate their agree-
ment to exchange information after learning their type. We assume that a time constraint associated
with the approval of a cost sharing agreement by a regulatory commision prevents any renogotiation
after stage 1.
4the entire vector of marginal costs (c1;:::;cN) .7 Otherwise, rm i only observes
its own marginal cost ci. Given the information structure on costs, each rm then
chooses its output level as to maximize its (expected) prots.
The model is solved using backward induction. In stage 3, the symmetric Nash equi-
librium quantity produced by a rm under a cost sharing agreement (i.e., competition








(2 + (n ¡ 1)b)(2¡ b)
(2.3)
On the other hand, when rms decide not to enter any agreement, they compete under
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Raith (1996) show that rms expected prots are larger under complete informa-
tion. Then, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium strategy is to agree to share cost
information in stage 1 and to choose quantity in stage 3 according to equation (2.3).
The e¤ect of cost sharing on consumers is not as straightforward. Sakai and Yamato
(1989) show that there exist some pairs (b;½) 2]0;1[2 such that the expected consumer
surplus is larger under information sharing, but this is possible only if costs are correlated
7To our knowledge, only Shapiro (1986) analyzes information sharing among subset of ￿rms. Given
the hypothesis that products are perfect substitutes, he shows that all ￿rms exchange cost information
in equilibrium. Note, as well, that some authors assume that ￿rms only observe a noisy version of their
competitors marginal costs: e cj = cj + "i 8j 6= i where "i is an error term (see Gal-Or (1986))
5and N ¸ 10. In other words, information sharing is harmful to consumers in oligopoly
structures with fewer than 10 rms. Finally, it has been established that cost information
sharing always improves social welfare in the SOM.
3. Comments and Generalization
The SOM relies upon two implicit assumptions:
² Assumption A1: The number of rms on the market is xed to N.
² Assumption A2: The number of rms on the market and the parameters of the
model are such that the probability that rms produce non-positive equilibrium
quantity is negligible.8
Assumption 1 implies that entry decisions are exogenous and, in particular, indepen-
dent of any agreement to exchange information. In other words, the number of rms
on the market is the same whether or not rms decide to exchange information. A
consequence of Assumption 2 is that the model may be solved as if all rms are going
to produce strictly positive quantities in equilibrium.
The objective of the present paper is to relax assumption 1 and to examine the
e¤ects of exchanges of cost information on entry decisions. However, in models with
entry, the probability of rms producing negative equilibrium quantities cannot always
be assumed negligible, since the number of rms varies endogenously. To see this,
8There exist parameters values such that the optimal strategies in (2.3) and (2.4) are negative.
6note that expected prots in both information structures are equal to E[(x⁄
i;d (ci))2] and
therefore they cannot be negative. Thus, the number of entrants may become unbounded
when costs of entry become arbitrarily small. Consequently, the probability of negative
equilibrium quantities cannot be ignored as it increases with the number of rms. Hence,
we rst generalize the SOM by adding a non-negativity constraint on quantities choices.9
We opted to add this constraint, as opposed to using a non-linear demand function, in
order to stay consistent with the demand hypotheses of the SOM.
3.1. A Generalized Standard Oligopoly Model
In the private (or incomplete) information structure, rm i now chooses a weakly positive





E [¼i;nsjci]=E [(pi ¡ ci)xijci] subject to xi ¸ 0






(a ¡ b(n ¡ 1)E [x
⁄jci] ¡ ci) Ifci•cg 8i =1 ;:::N (3.1)
where c = a ¡ b(n ¡ 1)E [x
⁄jc] ; (3.2)
9Since the distribution of costs is unbounded, marginal costs and prices may also be negative. The
probability of negative costs is negligible for an appropriate selection of parameters („;￿) and the results
in section 3 and 4 generalize to any non-negative continuous distribution on costs. The resolution of the
model under an additional non-negativity constraint on prices is truly non-trivial. In the subsequent
numerical simulations, the parameters of the model are such that prices are always positive.
7I
fci•cg is the indicator function dened as Ifci•cg =1when ci · c and Ifci•cg =0
otherwise, c is a threshold cost value and E [x⁄jci] is the conditional expected equilibrium
quantity of any competitor of player i. Note that rms only produce in equilibrium if
their marginal cost is below the threshold cost c.





¼i;s =( pi ¡ ci)xi subject to xi ¸ 0





































! 8i =1 ;:::;N (3.4)
The optimal solutions in both information structures are non-linear and they rely
upon a system of implicit equations. We propose in the Appendix a general algorithm
to determine numerically the constraint Nash equilibrium quantities. The object of this
algorithm is to solve numerically the implicit equations dening the di¤erent ci and to
approximate the function E [x⁄jci] using simulations.
We nd that the addition of a non-negativity constraint preserves rms incentive to
share information. We also nd that when consumers benet from information pooling
8in the SOM, they also benet in the generalized SOM. More signicantly, we identify
instances where consumers benet from information sharing in markets structures with
as few as two rms, in sharp contrast with ndings for the SOM (where we must have
N ¸ 10 for consumers to benet).
To illustrate, consider the following examples where costs are jointly normally dis-
tributed, a =1 0 , ¹ =1 0 , ¾2 =2and N 2 (2;10): F i r m se x p e c t e dp r o  t sa n d
consumer expected surplus in the standard and generalized models are compared for
(b;½) 2 [0;1]
2 in Graphs 1 to 2. Specic numerical results for (N =2 ;b=0 :5;½=0 :95)
and (N =1 0 ;b=0 :5;½=0 :7) are summarized in Tables 1 and 2. These results indicate
that rms increase their expected prots by exchanging information, albeit the gains
are slightly smaller (in absolute and relative terms) in our generalized model. The re-
sults also illustrate that consumers benet from information sharing for a larger set of
parameter values (N;b;½) than implied by the SOM.
Heuristically, the change in information structure (from incomplete to complete in-
formation) in the SOM a¤ects only the quantity produced by a rm. In the generalized
SOM both the quantity produced and the probability that a rm is active are a¤ected.10
Under appropriate values of (b;½), a market may then be active more frequently under
complete information which, in turn, may improve consumer welfare. For instance, in
Table 1, although the probability that a given rm produces a positive quantity may be
lower under complete information than with incomplete information, entry decisions are
10A ￿rm is said to be active when it produces a strictly positive quantity in equilibrium. Likewise, a
market is said to be active when at least one ￿rm is active.
9less correlated.11
4. The Model with Entry
We now extend the traditional model to examine the e¤ects of exchanges of information
on entry decisions. The structure of the model is as follows:
² Stage 1:T h eN rms simultaneously decide whether or not to enter into a binding
agreement to exchange cost information.
² Stage 2: Each rm chooses whether or not to enter the market. If rm i enters
t h em a r k e ti ti n c u r sa x e dc o s t sFi. Fixed costs are assumed to be common
knowledge and sunk upon entry.
² Stage 3: If the entrants agreed to share cost information in stage 1, then they
observe the entire vector of marginal costs. Otherwise, each entrant observes only
its own marginal cost. Then, given the information structure on costs, the rms
simultaneously choose their output level, subject to the constraint that they pro-
duce a non-negative quantity. In other words, should a rm have a high marginal
cost given the number of entrants, it may choose not to supply the market by
s e l e c t i n ga no u t p u to fz e r o .
The xed costs may include foreseeable expenses associated with investments in ca-
pacity, R&D, contract or licensing fees, and development of sales, supply, or distribution
11We de￿ne a variable ENTRY such that ENTRYi;j =1when ￿rm i enters the market at simulation
j and ENTRYi;j = ¡1 otherwise.
10channels. These xed costs may be incurred by new rms to enter the market or by
incumbents to renew their activity. Marginal costs, on the other hand, are inherently
a¤ected by factors such as input prices, workers productivity or unforeseen idiosyncratic
events such as delays. In this context, a rm precisely observe its marginal cost only at
t h et i m eo fp r o d u c t i o n .
The structure of this model characterizes R&D intensive industries (e.g. semicon-
ductors), industries with sunk capacity investments (e.g. steel), or industries where
extensive marketing or distribution channels are necessary (e.g. airlines (see Kuhn and
Vives (1995), automobile (see Doyle and Snyder (1999))). In these industries, trade
associations and joint ventures have historically been the mediums for exchanges of
information. In recent years however, B2B ecommerce internet platforms have both
facilitated and widely expanded exchanges of information. The timing of our model is
consistent with rms practices and policy-makers regulatory approach. For example,
when the major auto-makers considered exchanging information on supply parts through
a B2B internet marketplace (e.g. the Covisint project), they rst announced publicly
their intentions, then awaited for the Federal Trade Commission guarded approval before
proceeding with foreseeable development costs.12
12Concise overviews of the Covisint decision can be found in ￿B2B Exchanges Get Yellow Antitrust
Light￿ from the law ￿rm Katten Muchin Zavis, available at www.kmz.com, and on Professor Jack M.
Wilson website at www.jackmwilson.com/eBusiness/.
114.1. Exchanges of Information: Firms Incentives
We now show that, in contrast to the ndings for the SOM, rms may not nd it
protable to exchange cost information in a model with entry.
Rank, without loss of generality, rms according to their xed cost F1 · F2 ·
::: · FN. In stage 2, rms have not yet observed their marginal cost. Hence, rms
are symmetric and expected (variable) prots in stage 3, which are conditional upon the
number of entrants and the information structure, are identical across rms. Let E [¼djn]
denote a rms conditional expected prots in stage 3 given information structure d,
given d 2f s;nsg,a n dn entrants. Then let n⁄
d =s u p 1•n•N (n : E [¼djn] ¡ Fn ¸ 0)
be the number of rms that have non-negative net expected prots in stage 2 under
information structure d.
As conditional expected prots in stage 3 strictly decline with the number n of
entrants, n⁄
s and n⁄
ns are uniquely dened.13 However, the identity of the n⁄
q entering
rms need not be unique, as when rms n⁄
q and n⁄
q +1are such that one or the other
(but not both) have positive expected prots in the presence of rms 1 to (n⁄
q ¡ 1).W e
assume that the identity of the rms in n⁄
s and n⁄
ns is unique and concentrate on the
socially e¢cient Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Under this solution concept, the
rms that enter in the equilibrium are the ones with the smallest xed costs.
We saw in Section 3 that, for a given number of rms, expected prots are higher
under information sharing. It follows, from the denition of n⁄
q, that the number of
13See Berry (1992) for a proof of this result.
12entrants in stage 2 is at least as large under an agreement to exchange information than
under no agreement (i.e., n⁄
s ¸ n⁄
ns). Hence, we need to consider three cases:
² (4.1.1) If n⁄
s = n⁄
ns; then rms exchange cost information.
If the number of entrants is the same under both information structures, then the
model is similar to the generalized SOM developed in Section 3. In that Section, we
found that, for a given number of rms, expected prots are higher under information
sharing. Therefore, in the equilibrium, rms 1 through n⁄
s agree to exchange cost infor-
mation in stage 1 and enter in stage 2. They then choose quantities in stage 3 under
complete information according to (3.3). Firms n⁄
s +1to N,m e a n w h i l e ,s t a yo u to ft h e
market in stage 2, in which case their decision on an information exchange in stage 1 is
inconsequential.
² (4.1.2) If n⁄
s >n ⁄
ns and E [¼sjn⁄
s] <E[¼nsjn⁄
ns], then rms do not exchange cost
information.
In (4.1.2), rms 1 through n⁄
ns are worst o¤, in expected terms, under an agreement
to exchange information. Thus, in the equilibrium, (at least one of) these rms do not
exchange cost information.14 Then, rms 1 through n⁄
ns enter in stage 2 and choose
quantities in stage 3 under incomplete information according to (3.1). Meanwhile, rms
(n⁄
ns +1 )t oN stay out of the market in stage 2.
14Allowing for subsets of entrants to exchange information may yield additional solutions in (4.1.2).
Consider, for instance, a model with 3 ￿rms such that n⁄
s =3and n⁄
ns =1and (4.1.2) holds. Then ￿rm
1 (which has the lowest ￿xed cost) does not want to exchange information. Firms 2 and 3 may however
agree to exchange with each other in which case, say, they enter. The equilibrium solution may then
involve an exchange of information among the ￿rms.
13To illustrate, consider the duopoly example in Table 1 with F1 =0 :16 and F2 =
0:163: We have that n⁄
ns =1since E [¼nsjn⁄
ns =2 ]=0 :162 <F 2,a n dn⁄
s =2since
E [¼sjn⁄
s =2 ]=0 :166 >F 2: As E [¼sjn⁄
s =2 ]=0 :166 < 0:25 = E [¼nsjn⁄
ns =1 ] , r m1
has higher expected prots if it does not exchange information. Hence, in the equilibrium
solution, rms do not exchange information in stage 1 and only rm 1 enters in stage 2.
In stage 3, it produces the monopoly output given its marginal cost.
² (4.1.3) If n⁄
s >n ⁄
ns and E [¼sjn⁄
s] ¸ E [¼nsjn⁄
ns], then rms exchange cost informa-
tion.
In this instance, rms 1 through n⁄
ns are better o¤ under an agreement to exchange
information and the equilibrium solution is identical to that in (4.1.1).
4.2. Exchanges of Information: Consumer Welfare
Here, we show that consumers may benet from exchanges of information across a wider
range of market structures than implied by the SOM. We rst consider the case where
the number of entrants (in stage 2) is larger under information sharing.
² (4.2.1) If n⁄
s >n ⁄
ns, then consumers may benet from exchanges of information.
For example, in our duopoly example in Table 1 with F1 =0 :16 and F2 =0 :163,
expected consumer surplus is higher with information sharing (i.e. 0:240 vs. 0:125). Note
that consumers may benet even when costs are uncorrelated, in contrast to ndings in
the SOM. For instance, assume that ½ =0and F2 =0 :21, but all other parameters are
14unchanged, in our duopoly example of Table 1. Then n⁄
ns =1 , n⁄
s =2 , and expected
consumer surplus is again higher with information sharing (i.e. 0:245 vs. 0:125).
² (4.2.2) If n⁄
s >n ⁄
ns and E [¼sjn⁄
s] <E [¼nsjn⁄
ns], social welfare may be higher if
rms were to exchange information.
In (4.2.2), rms do not exchange information since it reduces their expected prots
and, thus, only rms 1 to n⁄
ns enter (see 4.1.2). If rms were to share information
though, additional rms would enter and the increase in consumer surplus might more
than compensate for rms losses, so that social welfare would be higher. For instance,
in our duopoly example with F1 =0 :16 and F2 =0 :163; social welfare would be higher
if rms shared information (i.e. 0:33 vs. 0:215).15
This discussion suggests that policy-makers may want to entice rms to exchange
information. Such incentives could be provided with lump-sum taxes on the consumers
income or on rms prots. More signicantly, such incentives may actually involve
no monetary transfers in equilibrium. Suppose, in our duopoly example, that policy-
makers guarantee to provide a sum of 0:02 to rm 2 if it enters and does not exchange
information. Then, if rms do not exchange information and rm 2 enters, it expects to
earn net prots of 0:01 = 0:162+0:02¡0:163, in which case it enters. Since n⁄
ns = n⁄
s =2 ,
it is now optimal for both rms to share information (see (4.1.1)), in which case rm 2
earns net expected prots of 0:03 (i.e., ¡0:163 + 0:166). Thus, the equilibrium solution
15Under information sharing, expected net pro￿ts are equal to 0:166 £ 2 ¡ 0:163 ¡ 0:1 6=0 :09 and
expected consumer surplus is 0:24, so that expected social welfare equals to 0:33. Under no information
sharing, expected social welfare is equal to 0:25 ¡ 0:1 6+0 :125 = 0:215:
15has rms sharing information in stage 1. Both consumers and society benet and, since
rms share information, policy-makers never actually subsidize rm 2.
Finally, when information sharing does not a¤ect the number of entrants (i.e., n⁄
s =
n⁄
ns), the consumer surplus analysis is equivalent to the one conducted in Section 3:
² (4.2.3) When n⁄
s = n⁄
ns ¸ 2, consumers may benet from information sharing for
a larger set of parameters (b;½) 2]0;1[2 than the SOM suggests.
In particular, consumers may benet from exchanges of information in market struc-
t u r e sw i t ha sf e wa st w o r m s .
5. Conclusion
We have shown that endogenizing entry decisions a¤ects predictions regarding rms
decisions to share cost information and the e¤ect of information sharing on consumer
welfare. As illustrated in our discussion, rms may actually decide not to exchange
information in a competitive Cournot model with cost uncertainty, even though such
an exchange may improve consumer and social welfare. Hence, policy-makers may want
to entice rms to share information. Such incentives could be provided through trade
groups, B2B ecommerce platforms, or research consortia. We also showed that policy-
makers may not even need to make any monetary transfers or payments to induce rms
to share information. In fact, we nd that consumers may benet from information
sharing in a wide range of market structures, including oligopolies with few rms (e.g.,
duopolies). These results are signicant, as they contrast, for instance, with current
16policy concerns regarding B2B exchanges. In particular, our analysis suggests that,
pending a competitive marketplace, B2B exchanges encourage entry and, thereby, benet
consumers. Even if such exchanges do not expand the number of entrants, our ndings
indicate that they may make it more economical for rms to enter small markets that
otherwise would be too expensive to supply. Indeed, as we documented in Section 3, rms
more frequently supply a market where production costs are high when they compete
under information sharing.16
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187.  Tables  and  Graphs
TABLE 1 : TWO FIRMS
Quantity Profit Entry Consumer
Surplus
Mean Var Cov Mean Var Cov Proba Var Cov Mean Var
C.I 0.227 0.114 0.095 0.166 0.138 0.111 0.483 0.999 0.728 0.240 0.525 With
Constraint I.I 0.226 0.111 0.104 0.162 0.133 0.111 0.448 0.997 0.789 0.238 0.532
C.I 0.002 0.334 0.290 0.334 0.222 0.167 1 0 0 0.479 0.661 Without
Constraint I.I 0.003 0.326 0.310 0.326 0.215 0.170 1 0 0 0.481 0.674
C.I and I.I respectively stand for Complete Information and Incomplete Information.
TABLE 2 : TEN FIRMS
Quantity Profit Entry Consumer
Surplus
Mean Var Cov Mean Var Cov Proba Var Cov Mean Var
C.I 0.114 0.055 0.008 0.068 0.044 0.003 0.314 0.862 0.154 0.799 1.257 With
Constraint I.I 0.096 0.025 0.016 0.034 0.02 1.1D-4 0.398 0.958 0.472 0.762 1.706
C.I 7.1D-4 0.275 0.008 0.274 0.15 5.5D-4 1 0 0 1.550 1.372 Without
Constraint I.I 0.001 0.075 0.053 0.076 0.039 0.001 1 0 0 1.564 2.139
C.I and I.I respectively stand for Complete Information and Incomplete Information.GRAPH 1 : 2 PLAYERS
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0-0.02 0.02-0.04 0.04-0.06 0.06-0.08 0.08-0.18. Appendix: Determining Equilibrium Quantities.
The numerical determination of the complete information problem is straightforward.
We use standard numerical procedures to solve the system of non-linear equations (3.4)
leading to the threshold costs ci. Then, we can determine the equilibrium quantities by
substituting ci in (3.3).
To determine equilibrium quantities in the incomplete information model, we need
to solve the system of equations (3.2) and then (3.1). Note that (3.1) depends upon the
function E [x(c)jci]: In this case, unlike a complete information setting, rms cannot
predict the exact quantities that their rivals produce at the Nash solution. To deter-
mine their best strategies, rms can rely only upon their rivals conditional expected
quantities, E [x(c)jci]. There is no analytically tractable way, however, to calculate the
function E [x(c)jci] at any point ci:
We propose to replace this function by an approximation f (ci;¯) parametrized by
av e c t o r¯: Intuitively, f (:;¯) is the xed point solution of a problem matching a po-
tential expected quantity to its empirical counterpart as calculated across Monte Carlo
simulations. The algorithm proceeds as follows:
We simulate S private types (using the Common Random Number technique) for the
representative rm;fe csgs=1;:::;S ; from a normal distribution with mean ¹ and variance
¾2: For each value e cs; we then simulate K conditional private types;fe cs;kgk=1;:::;K ; from
a normal distribution with mean ¹(1 ¡ ½)+½e cs and variance ¾2 (1 ¡ ½)
2 : Therefore, e cs;k
may be interpreted as the private cost of an opponent of rm i, conditional on the fact
22that rm i has a cost e cs:
The determination of the approximation f (:;¯) proceeds in several steps. First,
for a given approximation of the conditional expectation (f (:;¯)) we nd c(e cs;k) and
e x(e cs;kje cs) for any e cs;k by solving numerically equations (3.2) and (3.1). Next, we calculate
the conditional empirical mean b E [x(c)je cs] of the quantity produced by an opponent of
rm i,w h e n r mi has a cost e cs: The object of the algorithm is then to nd ¯ such that
f (e cs;¯) is arbitrarily close to b E [x(c)je cs] for any e cs: In other words, the approximation





jjf (e cs;¯) ¡ b E [x(c)je cs]jj where (8.1)
f (e cs;¯) is a piecewise linear function with parameters ¯ 2<
l ;





e x(e cs;kje cs) ;
e x(e cs;kje cs)=
1
2
(a ¡ b(n ¡ 1)f (e cs;k;¯) ¡ e cs;k) Ife cs;k<c(e cs;k)g ;
c(e cs;k)=a ¡ b(n ¡ 1)f (e cs;k;¯) :
In practice, K =1 0 4;S=1 0 6, l =5 , and the precision for the minimization problem in
(7.1) is of order 10¡9: Once f (:;¯) has been determined, we can calculate the equilibrium
quantities for a given cost vector c:
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